The United States and Iran are conducting indirect talks through Qatari mediators in Doha rather than direct negotiations, and Iran has now formally stated that substantive peace discussions will not begin until two preconditions are met: a halt to Israeli military operations in Lebanon, and the release of frozen Iranian assets promised under the June 17 memorandum of understanding signed at Versailles. The developments, which emerged Tuesday, have further complicated an already fragile ceasefire framework and raised new questions about whether the 60-day window for a permanent agreement can produce a deal before it expires.
The State of the Talks
Iran says talks on a final deal will not begin until hostilities end in Lebanon and the US releases frozen Iranian funds. Indirect talks began on Tuesday, with US envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner meeting with Qatari mediators, including the country’s prime minister. The Qataris also met with Iranian officials, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi, who reportedly prioritised the potential release of frozen Iranian assets, as promised under the US-Iran memorandum of understanding. There are no plans for direct meetings in the near future.
The format — American officials meeting with Qatari mediators, who then meet separately with Iranian officials, who relay positions back through the same channel — reflects the depth of the trust deficit between Washington and Tehran. Direct US-Iran negotiations of the kind that produced the 2015 nuclear deal required years of diplomatic groundwork. The current framework is attempting to compress that process into 60 days, under conditions of active military confrontation.
Iran’s Two Preconditions
Tehran’s insistence on two preconditions before substantive talks begin represents a significant complication.
The first — ending hostilities in Lebanon — ties the US-Iran bilateral negotiation to the separate Israel-Lebanon conflict, a linkage the Trump administration has consistently tried to resist. Secretary of State Rubio has argued that the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire and the US-Iran nuclear and Hormuz negotiations are distinct tracks that should proceed independently. Iran has just as consistently insisted they are linked, arguing that its willingness to reach a permanent agreement is contingent on Israeli military action in Lebanon stopping first.
The second precondition — the release of frozen Iranian assets — reflects a specific promise embedded in the June 17 MoU that has not yet been fulfilled. The MoU was understood by Tehran to include immediate economic relief as part of the ceasefire package. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Gharibabadi reportedly made the release of these funds his first priority in the Doha talks, signalling that Tehran views the US failure to act on this provision as evidence of bad faith.
What the MoU Promised — and What Has Been Delivered
The memorandum of understanding signed at Versailles offered Iran economic relief in exchange for a pledge never to develop nuclear weapons. But the pace of implementation has been contested.
The US Treasury Department had previously sanctioned Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority — the IRGC-linked body Iran established during the conflict to manage Hormuz transit — describing it as an “attempt by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to monetise its campaign of state-sponsored terror.” Treasury Secretary Bessent underscored that the US would “not tolerate any effort to impose a tolling system in the Strait of Hormuz.” The continued existence of those sanctions is itself an obstacle to the economic relief Iran was promised.
Meanwhile, the technical working groups established by the Swiss talks — on Sanctions Termination, Nuclear Affairs, Iran Reconstruction and Economic Development, and Monitoring and Implementation — have stalled as the security situation on the ground has deteriorated.
Trump Considers Returning to Full Military Action
The most alarming development to emerge from Tuesday’s reporting was that Trump has reportedly considered returning to all-out war with Iran, holding multiple conversations with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and General Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in recent days.
Whether this represents a genuine policy reconsideration or a negotiating posture designed to increase pressure on Tehran is unclear. The Trump administration has consistently used the threat of resumed military action as its primary leverage in the negotiations, and the pattern of threatening escalation before de-escalating has been a feature of Trump’s Iran policy throughout the conflict.
But the language coming from the White House — Trump’s stated threat to “militarily complete the job” — combined with the reports of conversations with military commanders, has introduced a new level of uncertainty about whether the ceasefire framework will hold through the remainder of the 60-day window.
The Qatar Factor
Qatar’s role as the primary mediator reflects both its unique diplomatic position — maintaining relationships with both the US, which hosts the Al Udeid Air Base on Qatari soil, and Iran, with which Qatar shares the world’s largest natural gas field — and the absence of any alternative channel.
Qatar’s prime minister met Tuesday with both US envoys and Iranian officials, making the Gulf state the indispensable intermediary in a negotiation where the two primary parties are simultaneously conducting military operations against each other’s assets.
Oman, which had served as an earlier back-channel for US-Iran communication and which hosts the strait’s southern shipping corridor, was complicated as a mediator after Trump made a widely reported comment threatening to “blow up” Oman if it imposed tolls on the strait — a remark the White House subsequently walked back after Oman provided assurances it would not do so.
What Happens Next
The 60-day window runs until approximately August 17. With the first weeks consumed by military escalation and precondition-setting, the effective window for substantive negotiations is already significantly shorter than the headline figure implies.
For a deal to be reached, the US must take concrete steps on frozen Iranian assets and somehow manage the Lebanon linkage — either by securing a genuine Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire or by convincing Iran to de-link the two tracks. Iran must accept some form of Hormuz governance that preserves free passage for international shipping without rendering its own strategic leverage meaningless.
Neither concession is easy for either side. And with Trump reportedly considering a return to full military action, the diplomatic space available for compromise is narrowing at the same speed as the clock.
