Yemen’s Houthi movement launched its most direct and significant attack on US naval power since the beginning of the US-Iran war on Wednesday, firing seven anti-ship ballistic missiles and 14 drones at the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group operating in the Red Sea. All incoming threats were intercepted by the carrier group’s defensive systems.
No US casualties were reported. But the attack — the first Houthi strike directly targeting a US Navy carrier strike group — confirmed that Iran’s reported instruction to prepare to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has translated into active Houthi operations, sent Brent crude to $84 per barrel, and transformed the Red Sea from a contested commercial shipping lane into an active military confrontation zone.
What the Houthis Did and When
The attack occurred on the evening of July 22 in the southern Red Sea, approximately 200 kilometres north of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The Houthi military spokesman announced via their Al-Masirah television channel that the movement had targeted the Harry S. Truman carrier strike group with a barrage of anti-ship ballistic missiles and drones, describing the attack as a response to continued US strikes on Yemen and as support for Iran in its conflict with the United States.
The USS Harry S. Truman — a Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier — and its accompanying destroyer and cruiser escorts engaged all incoming threats using a combination of Standard Missile-3 and Standard Missile-6 interceptors, Phalanx close-in weapon systems, and electronic countermeasures. A carrier strike group’s defensive architecture is designed precisely for this threat profile: multiple layers of interceptor capability that collectively provide a high probability of neutralising incoming anti-ship missiles and drone swarms.
The interception of all seven anti-ship missiles and 14 drones without casualties represents the defensive systems performing as designed. It does not represent a defeat for the Houthis in any strategic sense — the attack demonstrates their ability to target US carrier groups with complex munition packages, and the expenditure of US Navy interceptors in defending against Houthi attacks continues to consume missile inventories that are already strained by the broader conflict demands.
The Connection to Iran’s Bab el-Mandeb Instruction
Three sources told Reuters earlier this week that Iran had asked Yemen’s Houthi movement to stand ready to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait if the United States followed through on President Donald Trump’s threat to attack Iranian power plants and bridges. The final decision on whether to take action against shipping in the strait would be taken by representatives of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps based in Yemen.
Wednesday’s attack on the Harry S. Truman is the operational expression of that strategic posture. The Houthis are not merely preparing to close the Bab el-Mandeb if triggered by further US strikes on Iran — they are actively targeting US naval forces in the Red Sea now, in a campaign that combines maritime coercion with anti-carrier operations.
The escalatory logic that Iran is employing is consistent with the pattern of the broader conflict: maintain pressure on the US and its allies across multiple fronts simultaneously, creating a theatre of operations so geographically dispersed that no single US military response can address all of them effectively.
The Oil Market Response
Brent crude rose to $84 per barrel following the attack — its highest level since the post-ceasefire spike on July 8, when oil jumped 9.6% after Trump declared the ceasefire over. The market’s response reflects the specific additional risk that a carrier group attack in the Red Sea represents: if the Houthis are willing to target US naval vessels, no commercial shipping in the Red Sea is secure.
The Maersk shipping company had announced on July 9 that vessels on its Middle East to US East Coast service would resume transiting through the Red Sea rather than routing around the Cape of Good Hope. That decision will be under urgent review following Wednesday’s attack. If major shipping lines return to the Cape of Good Hope routing — adding two to three weeks to transits between Europe and Asia — the global supply chain disruption from the Iran war will deepen significantly.
What Comes Next
The US military’s immediate response options range from retaliatory strikes on Houthi military infrastructure — a strategy that has been employed repeatedly since the Houthis began their maritime campaign in 2023 without permanently ending their ability to mount attacks — to more targeted operations against the IRGC representatives in Yemen who the Reuters sources identified as controlling the Bab el-Mandeb closure decision.
The broader question is whether the Houthi attack on the Harry S. Truman represents the beginning of the Bab el-Mandeb closure campaign, or whether it is a demonstrative operation designed to signal capability and deter further US strikes on Iran without actually closing the strait. The distinction is consequential: a carrier strike group attack that fails to sink or significantly damage a vessel demonstrates the threat without triggering the catastrophic global energy consequences that a full Bab el-Mandeb closure would produce.
For the global economy, both routes to Middle Eastern oil are now simultaneously under active military threat for the first time in modern history. The implications for oil prices, insurance markets, food supply chains and the broader global economy of a sustained Red Sea closure — on top of the already partially closed Strait of Hormuz — have no historical precedent to draw on.
