With the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed to commercial shipping for 100 days, the world’s oil-producing nations have activated alternative pipelines, launched new sea routes, and revived dormant infrastructure — but the combined alternatives can move at most 25% of what Hormuz normally handles, and the gap between what exists and what is needed remains the defining constraint of the global energy crisis.
Gulf states told CNBC Iran’s behaviour had created a “huge trust gap” that might never be repaired, and have signalled they are looking for permanent ways to re-route their supplies and bypass the Strait of Hormuz.
When the Strait of Hormuz was effectively closed in late February, the question that energy markets asked immediately was: what are the alternatives? The answer that has emerged over 100 days is simultaneously impressive in its ingenuity and sobering in its inadequacy. The world has done everything available to reroute oil — and it has not been enough.
The April 2026 International Energy Agency Report describes the current situation as the most severe oil supply shock in history.
The IEA’s characterisation — the most severe oil supply shock in history — carries weight precisely because it comes from the institution created after the 1973 Arab oil embargo to coordinate the world’s response to exactly this kind of disruption. The 1973 embargo, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Gulf War, the Iraq War — none produced a shock of this magnitude. The strait that handles 20 million barrels per day of crude oil, petroleum products, and LNG has been effectively shut for longer than any previous disruption.
Alternative Route 1: Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline
Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have oil pipelines that bypass the waterway. The East-West pipeline, linking processing facilities near the Persian Gulf to an export hub on the Red Sea, and the UAE pipeline to the port of Fujairah, have a combined estimated 3.5-5.5 million barrels per day of available capacity, the IEA notes, although Saudi Arabia said in March its pipeline is pumping 7 million barrels per day.
The Saudi East-West pipeline — formally the Abqaiq-Yanbu crude oil pipeline, also known as the Petroline — is the most important piece of existing infrastructure for oil rerouting. It runs 1,200 kilometres across the Arabian Peninsula from the giant Abqaiq processing complex near Dhahran on the Gulf coast to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea. From Yanbu, oil can be loaded onto tankers heading north to the Suez Canal or south toward Asian markets via the Bab al-Mandab.
As of early 2026, it is estimated that about 2 million barrels per day of the pipeline’s capacity is used, leaving between 3 and 5 million barrels per day of spare capacity, depending on operational conditions and available export capacity on the Saudi West Coast. Since the Hormuz closure, Saudi Aramco has pushed the pipeline to its operational limits.
The critical constraint is that the East-West pipeline only carries Saudi oil. Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, the UAE, and Qatar — all of which have significant export volumes that normally leave the Gulf through Hormuz — cannot use Saudi pipeline infrastructure without Saudi consent and appropriate commercial arrangements. The pipeline solves Saudi Arabia’s export problem. It does not solve the Gulf’s export problem.
The East-West pipeline has reportedly been pumping oil westwards at its virtual capacity of 7 million barrels per day worth of crude, with exports via the Red Sea’s Yanbu terminal hitting 5 million barrels per day.
Alternative Route 2: UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah Pipeline
The UAE has its own bypass infrastructure: the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline, which runs from the Habshan processing complex inland to the Fujairah oil terminal on the UAE’s Gulf of Oman coastline. The pipeline bypasses the Strait of Hormuz entirely, as Fujairah sits on the ocean-facing side of the Musandam Peninsula.
Before the Hormuz closure, the pipeline was used for a fraction of UAE capacity. Since February 28, ADNOC has been running it at or near maximum throughput to maximise what it can export without Hormuz access.
The combination of the Saudi and UAE pipelines — both running at or near capacity — provides the most significant existing alternative to Hormuz. But even at maximum utilisation, they carry substantially less than what the strait normally moves.
Alternative Route 3: The New Saudi-UAE Sea Bypass
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have announced collaboration on an alternative bypass around the Strait of Hormuz. New sea and land routes connect oil refineries in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, to the UAE port of Khorfakkan on the Gulf of Oman. The route would be jointly operated by Mawani (Saudi Ports Authority) and the Sharjah logistics company Gulftainer.
The Dammam-to-Khorfakkan maritime shuttle — launched in April 2026 as a direct response to the Hormuz closure — creates a new logistics corridor that did not exist before the crisis. Oil moves by truck, rail, or short sea voyage from Saudi Arabia’s eastern oilfields to Khorfakkan on the Gulf of Oman, bypassing Hormuz entirely.
In April 2026, Saudi Arabian Railways announced five new freight logistics corridors, expanding overland connections to Saudi Red Sea ports.
The infrastructure investments being made in response to the Hormuz closure are not trivial. They represent a structural adaptation to a world in which Hormuz is no longer treated as a reliable long-term shipping route — regardless of whether the current crisis ends. Gulf states are building bypass capacity because they have concluded, as the CNBC source noted, that Iran has created a “huge trust gap” that will change their approach to export infrastructure permanently.
Alternative Route 4: Iraq-Turkey Pipeline Revival
Iraq has an almost 600-mile pipeline to Turkey, which has a total capacity of around 1.6 million barrels per day. The pipeline had been closed but will be reopened soon due to the Hormuz disruption, reportedly with an initial capacity of 250,000 barrels per day.
The Iraq-Turkey pipeline — the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline — connects Iraqi oilfields in Kirkuk to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. It was closed in March 2023 following an arbitration ruling involving Turkey and Iraq, and has not been operating since. The Hormuz closure created the economic and diplomatic pressure needed to reopen commercial negotiations, and the pipeline is being brought back into service.
At 250,000 barrels per day initial capacity — a fraction of its theoretical maximum — the Iraq-Turkey pipeline’s contribution is modest. But it demonstrates the broader dynamic of the crisis: infrastructure that was uneconomic or politically blocked before the Hormuz closure is becoming viable because the alternative is worse.
The Netanyahu Pipeline Proposal
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has proposed a new regional energy initiative that would involve constructing oil and gas pipelines across the Arabian Peninsula, aiming to transport energy supplies directly to Israeli ports while bypassing the Strait of Hormuz.
Netanyahu’s proposal — first circulated in March 2026 — involves overland pipeline routes connecting Gulf energy-producing regions to Israel’s Mediterranean coast. From Israeli ports, oil could be loaded onto tankers for European markets without any exposure to the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandab, or the Suez Canal.
The geopolitical implications of the proposal are significant. Any Gulf oil that moves through Israeli ports creates a commercial and physical dependency on Israeli infrastructure — a development that would reshape the region’s energy politics in ways that outlast the current crisis.
Arab states’ willingness to route oil through Israel — even following the normalisation agreements of 2020 — remains politically sensitive. Several countries have not formally endorsed the proposal. But the private commercial conversations are occurring in a way that would not have been credible eighteen months ago.
The Gap: What the Math Says
The fundamental arithmetic of the Hormuz rerouting effort is sobering.
The Strait of Hormuz normally handles approximately 20 million barrels per day of crude oil, petroleum products, and LNG. The alternatives available:
- Saudi East-West pipeline at capacity: approximately 5-7 million barrels per day (Saudi oil only)
- UAE Habshan-Fujairah pipeline at capacity: approximately 2 million barrels per day
- New Saudi-UAE sea bypass: additional capacity being developed, not yet at full scale
- Iraq-Turkey pipeline revival: 250,000 barrels per day initial, potentially scaling toward 1 million
Combined maximum: somewhere between 8 and 10 million barrels per day — approximately 40-50% of normal Hormuz volumes.
The gap between what the alternatives can move and what Hormuz normally moves is the oil supply shock the IEA is describing as the most severe in history. That gap — 10 to 12 million barrels per day of shortfall — is what has pushed oil above $100 per barrel and US inflation to 3.8%.
What the Long Term Looks Like
The crisis has accelerated infrastructure investments that will reshape Gulf energy logistics regardless of how the Iran war ends. The new Saudi-UAE bypass routes, the Iraq-Turkey pipeline revival, and the intensified discussion of Israeli corridor options are all creating physical infrastructure that will exist after a ceasefire is signed and the strait reopens.
Iraq is also considering long-considered pipelines to Oman, Jordan and Egypt, although these projects were previously put aside due to costs, conflict and security threats. Near-term expansion buys time and demonstrates political seriousness, while long-term network building is the only comprehensive solution.
The long-term transformation of Gulf energy infrastructure away from Hormuz dependency is, in a perverse way, one of the Iran war’s most durable consequences. Whether it provides adequate alternative capacity before the next crisis — or is simply a partial improvement that still leaves the global economy exposed to Hormuz disruption — will depend on investment decisions being made over the next three to five years.
LoudFact.com is an independent global news and explainer platform. This report is based on RSIS analysis published April 29, 2026, CNBC reporting from April 23, 2026, the IEA Strait of Hormuz resource page, EuroIntelligence analysis, and MEXC/Reuters reporting as of June 7-8, 2026.
