For 65 days, the US diplomatic position on Hormuz has been consistent: the strait must “complete, immediate, and safe” reopening to its prewar conditions. On Sunday, Iran publicly dismantled the premise of that demand.
Hormuz, in Iran’s own words, “will not return to its prewar conditions.” Understanding what that means — and what it doesn’t — is essential to understanding the shape of any possible deal.
The Statements
Tehran “will not back down from our position on the Strait of Hormuz, and it will not return to its prewar conditions,” Iran’s deputy parliament speaker, Ali Nikzad, said earlier Sunday.
Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, said Sunday that the “key to the Strait of Hormuz” remains in the Islamic Republic’s hands, according to state news agency Press TV.
Two separate Iranian officials. Two complementary statements. One is from the legislative branch; one is from the executive apparatus of the supreme leader. Together, they represent an institutional consensus rather than a tactical statement.
What “Prewar Conditions” Actually Were
Before February 28, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz operated under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’s right of transit passage. This gave all ships of all nations the right to transit the strait continuously and expeditiously, without Iranian permission, toll, or inspection. Iran could monitor traffic, but could not legally stop it, charge for it, or establish an approval mechanism for it.
Iran never accepted UNCLOS’s application to Hormuz — it claimed a narrower territorial waters framework. But in practice, the prewar conditions were: free passage for all, no tolls, Iranian monitoring but not Iranian control.
What Iran’s “New Mechanism” Would Create
Iran’s 14-point proposal calls for “a new mechanism for the Strait of Hormuz” — and Araghchi confirmed during his Islamabad visits that Iran sought Oman’s backing for a toll-collection arrangement. The new mechanism Iran envisions has several possible interpretations:
Most minimally: a bilateral Iran-Oman coordination framework that formalises existing Iranian monitoring while maintaining free passage for most nations. This would be politically manageable for the US to accept with appropriate framing.
Moderately: an Iranian permit system in which vessels file transit notifications with Iranian maritime authorities, with fees for some categories of traffic. This would be difficult but not impossible for the US to accept if the fee structure excluded US and allied vessels.
Most maximally: full Iranian sovereign control over Hormuz with mandatory tolls for all non-allied vessels — the version that Trump explicitly opposed and that the US Treasury has warned would trigger sanctions against any company that pays.
The diplomatic gap is not whether there will be a new mechanism — Iran has made clear one is required. The gap is what that mechanism looks like and how far it departs from the prewar free-passage regime that the US and international maritime law consider the baseline.
Why This Is Actually Manageable
Trump said Sunday he ordered the Navy to find and interdict any ship in international waters that has paid Iran a toll to transit the Strait of Hormuz.
“We think that they’ve gotten less than $1.3 million in tolls, which is a pittance on their previous daily oil revenues,” US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told Fox News on Sunday.
Iran is collecting $1.3 million in tolls against previous daily oil revenues of $400-500 million. The toll mechanism is a political and sovereignty statement, not a revenue strategy. Iran needs to be able to say it has established formal authority over Hormuz — it does not actually need the tolls to be financially significant.
A deal that gives Iran a nominal, low-value transit notification mechanism — framed as a “coordination protocol” rather than a toll — while maintaining functional free passage for all vessels could satisfy Iran’s sovereignty claim without constituting the “toll mechanism” that triggers US Treasury sanctions. The language of any such arrangement would be the subject of intense negotiation. But the underlying structure is bridgeable if both sides decide to bridge it.
