Iran says it “cannot trust the Americans at all.” “We really did the ceasefire at the request of other nations. I wouldn’t have really been in favor of it, but we did it as a favor to Pakistan,” Trump told reporters on Air Force One.
Former US Iran negotiator Rob Malley: “The level of trust is probably almost at an all-time low. It’s hard for them to take at their word what they’re hearing from US officials.”
These three statements — from Iran’s leadership, from Trump himself, and from the former US chief nuclear negotiator — define the specific obstacle that has prevented the MOU from being signed despite both sides’ stated desire to end the war.
The Anatomy of Mutual Distrust
Iran’s distrust of the United States is structural and historical. It predates the Iran war. It includes the 2015 JCPOA, which Iran signed and the US abandoned in 2018. It includes Trump’s return and his characterisation of the JCPOA as “a disaster.” It includes the Soleimani assassination in January 2020. And it includes the February 28 strikes that killed Iran’s supreme leader without warning, in what Iran’s leadership consistently characterises as an act of unprovoked aggression.
Every specific element of the MOU that Iran has “strongly rejected” can be traced to a specific distrust-based concern. The 12-15 year enrichment moratorium: Iran worries the US will not lift sanctions or maintain the deal’s economic benefits for 12-15 years, as it failed to do under the JCPOA.
The underground facility ban: Iran worries the US will use snap IAEA inspections of Fordow to gather intelligence for a future military strike on a facility it has declared closed. The HEU removal: Iran worries that surrendering its enriched uranium eliminates its nuclear deterrent and leaves it vulnerable to the same kind of US-Israeli strike that launched the current war.
The US’s distrust of Iran is equally structural. Every sanctions violation, every enrichment acceleration beyond JCPOA limits, every IRGC proxy attack from 2015 to 2026 has deposited evidence that Iran does not comply with agreements it finds inconvenient. The JCPOA’s enrichment limits were violated.
The Additional Protocol commitments were violated. The Trump administration’s specific distrust — that any deal Iran signs will be used to buy time while it advances toward weapons-grade enrichment — is the premise behind every demand for snap inspections, underground facility bans, and HEU removal.
How the MOU’s Architecture Addresses It
The specific architecture of the one-page MOU is designed for exactly this distrust environment. The MOU would declare an end to the war in the region and the start of a 30-day period of negotiations. Iran’s restrictions on shipping through the strait and the U.S. naval blockade would be gradually lifted during that 30-day period. If the negotiations collapse, U.S. forces would be able to restore the blockade or resume military action.
“Gradually lifted” and “if negotiations collapse, forces would restore the blockade” — these are specifically distrust-addressing provisions. Neither side has to trust the other to go first (reciprocal simultaneous lifting). Neither side has to trust the other to maintain the deal (the US retains the ability to restore the blockade if Iran violates commitments). Neither side has to trust the other’s good faith on the nuclear question (the moratorium starts after MOU signing, giving Iran a defined timeline rather than an open-ended obligation).
Iran would commit in the MOU to never seek a nuclear weapon or conduct weaponization-related activities. According to a U.S. official, the parties are discussing a clause whereby Iran would commit not to operate underground nuclear facilities. Iran would also commit to an enhanced inspections regime, including snap inspections by UN inspectors.
Snap inspections are the trust-substitute: because both sides don’t trust each other’s statements, they replace statements with verification. Iran doesn’t need to trust the US’s commitment to sanctions relief because the sanctions are lifted gradually as verified compliance continues. The US doesn’t need to trust Iran’s nuclear commitments because snap IAEA inspections verify them in real time.
The MOU is designed, clause by clause, for a distrust environment. It is the most sophisticated trust-building architecture that has ever been proposed in US-Iran diplomacy. The question that the next week will answer is whether 78 days of deepened distrust — anti-ship ballistic missiles, “garbage” rejections, “love taps,” and “we did it as a favor to Pakistan” — has accumulated to the point where even the trust-substitute architecture cannot bridge the gap.
